Dodging Drones
First reports of the Polish government's decision—an attempt to exchange domestic MiG-29 fighter jets for Ukrainian drone technologies—appeared as early as May this year. Since then, the exchange has not yet materialized.
The MiG-29 is an aircraft designed by Soviet engineers in the 1970s. It was intended as a response to the American F-15 and F-16, with which it was meant to engage in aerial combat. In Poland, it is considered an outdated platform currently being phased out of service in favor of modern Western technical solutions. Nevertheless, MiGs remain operational and, after suitable modifications, are being used by Ukrainians to engage enemy targets.
Kyiv has around 40 of these fighters at its disposal, 14 of which originated from Poland and 13 from Slovakia. Poland stands ready to hand over all 29 of its remaining MiG-29s to Ukraine in exchange for F-35 or KAI FA-50 fighters. Currently, talks between Kyiv and Warsaw concern 9 aircraft that Ukraine would receive in return for its broadly defined drone technology.
In mid-May, the Polish Deputy Minister of National Defence announced that an agreement with the Ukrainian side could not be reached. In late June, talks resumed before stalling once again. The reason was the poor technical condition of the fighters, which the Ukrainian side found unacceptable. Kyiv expects exchange talks to continue once Poland completes the necessary repairs and modernizations of the equipment. Another obstacle was the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes 'drone technology.' The Polish side lacked a clear declaration of what exactly it expected from Kyiv.
The Minister of Defence presented Warsaw's perspective on Polish Radio, pointing to two main issues stalling the agreement. First, he noted a lack of willingness on the Ukrainian side to finalize the deal; second, he highlighted historical political tensions that have hindered discussions—specifically, naming a Ukrainian military unit after 'UPA heroes' and the resulting fallout. The Minister emphasized that the term 'drone technology' was defined with sufficient precision for the purpose of the agreement. The head of the MOD concluded: 'There are no MiGs for Ukraine because there are no drones.'
In August, two contradictory announcements regarding the negotiations emerged. On one hand, media outlets reported progress facilitated by the appointment of Rustem Umerov as the new head of the foreign intelligence service. On the other hand, a post on X by Tymofiy Mylovanov painted a different picture. The former Ukrainian Minister of Economy, now President of the Kyiv School of Economics, stated plainly: 'Poland needs access to modern drone technology more than Ukraine needs those damn MiGs.'
The economist's perspective seemingly gained the upper hand in the Ukrainian calculus. At the Economic Forum in Karpacz, the Polish Minister of National Defence commented on the unfulfilled deal. He expressed disappointment over the aborted negotiations, pointing out that Ukrainian drone technology was simultaneously being sold to the Middle East amid the conflict involving Israel, the US, and Iran. Meanwhile, in July, Ukraine signed a Drone Deal with Canada, Norway, Saudi Arabia, the Baltic States, Denmark, and the Netherlands to facilitate tech sharing. Poland was left out of this agreement.
Polish coverage of the negotiations highlights a distinct lack of trust regarding the consistency of Ukrainian decision-making, the difficult nature of trading with eastern neighbors, and Kyiv's reluctance to finalize the deal. As the Minister himself admitted, the process is moving at a snail's pace.
Legislative Impact of Senator Graham's Passing
On July 12, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham passed away suddenly. He belonged to the old guard of the Republican Party, characterized by strong support for foreign policy interventionism. Driven by his hawkish view on US interests, he had been lobbying since May 2025 for legislation that would impose severe sanctions on Russia's trading partners. Graham's bill proposed granting the President the necessary authority to impose tariffs of up to 500% on goods imported to the US from countries supporting Russia's war effort—particularly through the purchase of Russian energy resources.
An exception to this rule applied to countries, mostly in Europe, that continue to support Ukraine's war effort despite maintaining trade relations with the Russian Federation.
Despite relatively strong bipartisan support for the initiative, the administration initially refrained from backing the bill, primarily due to the automatic nature of the secondary retaliatory tariffs. Without Trump's approval, the senator chose not to bring the bill to a vote. For 16 months, the document remained a ready-to-use tool for the White House should it choose to leverage it.
Ultimately, it was Senator Graham's death, along with major revisions to the document's text and the outbreak of war with Iran, that propelled the legislation forward. To honor the late senator shortly after his passing, the bill passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by the President as the 'Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act.' Beyond enabling secondary sanctions to penalize Russian policy, the law extends sanctions against Iran that were otherwise set to expire at the end of the current year.
The true driver behind the congressional consensus was the inclusion of three separate provisions crucial to key factions within Congress. The most significant shift was removing the automatic mandate for sanctions in favor of giving the President discretionary authority to impose secondary tariffs on any non-compliant nation, considering the global scale of trade with Russia.
This mechanism bypasses US Supreme Court rulings that deemed Trump's first-term tariff enforcement procedures unlawful. By expanding executive authority, the Trump camp accepted the final legislation. Meanwhile, the vast majority of Democrats voted in favor due to the punitive measures against Russian foreign policy. The traditional Republican establishment endorsed both aspects, seeing them as aligned with an interventionist foreign policy strategy.
Despite positive reactions from anti-aggression figures—including President Zelenskyy—the new law primarily expands presidential executive authority over US foreign policy. Donald Trump's initial reluctance was the main factor stalling the bill in the months preceding Graham's death. Contrary to its title, the legislation could ultimately serve objectives far removed from those envisioned by the late senator.
Strategic Implications of the Strike on Samara
On September 15, Ukrainian long-range Flamingo missiles struck Samara, hitting a building within the complex owned by Progress, a company responsible for the serial production of Soyuz rockets. It is the only facility in Russia where these rockets are manufactured from start to finish. Furthermore, the company accounts for the production of fully one-third of all satellites launched into space by the USSR and subsequently Russia.
The strike targeted Building 106A—a dedicated cleanroom where satellites and high-precision rocket components are assembled under ultrasterile conditions. As a result, operations at the plant have ground to a halt. Until Building 106A is cleared and restored, key assembly steps cannot take place, as it is the facility's sole infrastructure designed for this purpose. Restoring the cleanroom to its pre-strike condition could take months, depending on the extent of the damage.
These events unfold against the backdrop of Russian forces losing access to the Starlink network earlier this year. Russian troops had been capturing terminals used by Ukrainians and repurposing them for their own battlefield operations—having never signed a contract with the American company. Both Poland, which funds Ukrainian soldiers' internet access, and Ukraine raised the issue with Elon Musk. In response, SpaceX implemented whitelists and blacklists for terminals used by Ukrainian and Russian forces, respectively. Devices placed on the blacklist are remotely deactivated.
Satellites produced by the Russian firm Bureau 1440 were intended to serve as a substitute for Starlink's Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation. Although work on this alternative began shortly after Musk's intervention and achieved notable technical success, Moscow still relies on Soyuz rockets to deploy these payloads into space. The destruction of Building 106A will not just create, but significantly deepen the shortage of launch vehicles in the domestic Russian market.
Early this year, Dmitry Baranov, Deputy Director General of Roscosmos, stated that demand for Soyuz rockets would exceed supply by 30% to 50% between 2027 and 2030—a statement made prior to both the Starlink blackout and the attack on Samara.
Ukrainian Attacks on Ozon and Wildberries
On 18 July 2026, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched a series of attacks against Russia’s two largest e-commerce platforms, Wildberries and Ozon. According to a statement by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the logistics networks operated by these platforms are used to store and deliver military equipment, its components, and dual-use goods, making their warehouses legitimate military targets.
The operations are intended to disrupt supply chains supporting the Russian armed forces and also serve as a response to Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. Together with strikes against Russian oil refineries, they form part of Kyiv’s broader strategy aimed at depriving Russia of the financial resources needed to continue the war, while bringing hostilities onto the territory of the aggressor state and thereby shattering the image of normality that the Russian authorities seek to maintain among the population.
Designed to trigger a domino effect, the attacks caused estimated losses of $1.9–3 billion on the first day alone, following the destruction of key warehouse complexes in Elektrostal and Kotovsk.
Wildberries was founded in 2004 and, until recently, was one of the fastest-growing segments of the Russian economy, becoming the country’s largest e-commerce platform. It accounts for approximately 52% of Russian online retail and has expanded its logistics network since 2016 to include 200 fulfilment centres with a combined area of 5 million square metres.
The marketplace has become one of the most popular shopping channels among lower-income consumers, particularly residents of sparsely populated areas far from major urban centres, where access to traditional retail outlets is limited. Despite the outbreak of war and the imposition of sanctions, Wildberries continued to grow thanks to Russia’s authorization of so-called parallel imports, which allow goods to be imported without the consent of their original manufacturers or rights holders.
As a result, the company achieved an estimated market value of approximately $12.6 billion.
The second-largest player in the industry is Ozon, founded in 1998 as one of Russia’s first online retailers. Both companies, often described as the “Russian Amazon,” operate extensive networks of collection points and parcel lockers throughout the country. According to estimates, together they account for approximately 8.5% of Russia’s GDP.
Before the July attacks, Wildberries hosted more than one million sellers, most of them small and medium-sized enterprises, and offered approximately one billion products. The platform recorded more than 81 million monthly users and handled around 25 million orders per day. This enormous scale of operations generated substantial tax revenues for the Russian state budget. At the same time, the platform served as a sales channel for products used by the Russian armed forces or useful in military operations.
According to an investigation by the independent Russian media outlet Verstka (Russian: Вёрстка), its listings included bulletproof vests, drone components, navigation equipment, and other items of military gear purchased by volunteers supplying Russian soldiers. The mechanism is relatively straightforward: fundraising organizers publish links to specific products on the platform through their social media accounts and collect money to purchase them, or ask their followers to pay for orders themselves and have the parcels delivered to designated collection points. In total, at least 31,500 products were available in military-related categories.
By the end of August, Ukrainian attacks had affected at least 23 Wildberries facilities, 19 of which were substantially or completely destroyed. Initially, the combined area of damaged or unusable warehouses reached approximately 2.4 million square metres, equivalent to 43% of the company’s total warehouse infrastructure. The scale of the damage reflected the particular characteristics of logistics centres: extensive, easily identifiable buildings containing vast quantities of goods, where fires could rapidly spread to adjacent sections.
During the subsequent phase of the campaign, Ukrainian drones also targeted Ozon warehouses, damaging nine facilities. Ultimately, according to calculations by IBC Global, approximately 1.5 million square metres of warehouse space belonging to both platforms were taken out of service. The cost of rebuilding this infrastructure was estimated at around 115.5 billion rubles, or $1.39 billion. Meanwhile, as Ukrainian strikes intensified, sales of products with potential military applications declined, and Wildberries removed the “Everything for the SMO” category (Russian: Всё для СВО) from its listings.
The main consequence of the Ukrainian operation was estimated financial damage of 600–800 billion rubles (approximately $7.5–10 billion), affecting both Wildberries and the sellers operating on the platform. Around 400,000 entrepreneurs were affected, triggering a wave of bankruptcies and business closures. One indication of the scale of this phenomenon was the appearance of approximately 3,100 listings on Avito advertising Wildberries franchise collection points for sale.
In response to the crisis, the marketplace introduced assistance programmes that included compensation for lost goods, discounts on storage fees, free transfers of parcels to regional warehouses, and reductions in certain commissions and logistics charges. The Russian authorities also announced support measures, approving a one-year deferral of selected tax and social insurance payments for entrepreneurs whose losses amounted to at least 5% of their annual turnover. They also considered providing preferential loans through state-owned banks and awarding subsidies.
In addition, to protect its infrastructure, Wildberries plans to purchase 478,000 square metres of galvanized metal mesh to shield warehouses against drones, as well as silica fabric for 14 facilities to serve as a fire barrier. The company is also considering relocating some of its logistics centres to Kazakhstan, which, together with Russia, forms a common customs area within the Eurasian Economic Union.
Disruptions to the operation of e-commerce platforms have become another source of public dissatisfaction in Russia, which had already been growing in connection with the fuel crisis. Despite the assistance promised by Wildberries, some sellers complained about delayed payments and inadequate compensation.
The attacks on logistics centres once again exposed the vulnerability of Russian infrastructure and its weak points, demonstrating that even considerable distance from the front line does not guarantee the safety of facilities. They also highlighted the Ukrainian military’s ability to deliver destabilizing blows with far-reaching consequences for the Russian economy and society.
The operation sends an important signal to Kyiv’s Western partners, demonstrating Russia’s vulnerabilities and Ukraine’s operational capabilities. Psychologically, the campaign has also brought the war “back home” to Russians. Against this backdrop, Tatyana Kim, president and co-owner of Wildberries and Russia’s wealthiest woman, whose fortune was estimated at $8.1 billion by Forbes magazine, described the attacks on her company’s warehouses as “acts of terror.”
Operation “Vivaldi”
On 15 September 2026, Andriy Biletsky, commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps, publicly disclosed the Ukrainian offensive operation codenamed “Vivaldi” for the first time. Its objective is to reclaim Donbas and restore Ukrainian control over the territory, with the main operations concentrated around Lyman in the northern part of Donetsk Oblast. The campaign began as early as May this year, but both its preparations and its execution were shrouded in secrecy.
The codename “Vivaldi” refers to the Italian composer and his work The Four Seasons, symbolizing the division of the operation into four phases, three of which had been completed by the end of September. The mission was conducted in conditions where there was no conventional front line and a vast grey zone had emerged, reaching up to 40 km in some places.
It was also characterized by the extensive use of drones and ground robotic systems.
The first key stage of the operation involved targeted disruption strikes that enabled Ukrainian forces to eliminate Russian reconnaissance drones. This “blinded” Moscow’s forces, which failed to detect Ukrainian assault units advancing towards them. After disrupting the enemy’s supply lines through the targeted use of drones, the Ukrainians began attacking Russian troops as they crossed rivers in the Lyman area.
It is worth emphasizing the variety of tasks performed by unmanned aerial vehicles and ground robots during the first phase of the operation. The latter were used, among other things, to clear roads of mines, neutralizing mines along a stretch of approximately 30 km in just two nights. Meanwhile, heavy Vampire drones transported robots carrying explosive charges more than 10 km behind enemy lines, a tactic described as the “kangaroo strategy”.
Ground robotic systems were also deployed to fire on Russian positions using mounted grenade launchers and small arms.
The most important intermediate objective achieved during the operation was the disruption of Russian plans to encircle Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The Russian command intended to bypass Lyman, link up its forces in the Barvinkove area and trap Ukrainian units within the so-called Donbas fortress belt. Operation “Vivaldi” not only thwarted this scenario but also enabled Ukrainian forces to recapture 51 km² of territory during the third phase of the campaign.
Regaining control of the villages of Nove, Ridkodub, Katerynivka, Karpivka and Novomykhailivka increased the total area of liberated territory since the beginning of the offensive to 176 km². Despite these reports, Russia’s Ministry of Defence has not commented directly on the situation. On its Telegram channel, it continues to maintain that Russian Federation forces are “firmly holding their positions”, while also claiming to have captured Novovodyane.
During the operation, nearly 250 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner, primarily in the area between the Nitrius and Chornyi Zherebets rivers. This represents an unusually high number of prisoners for a single military campaign. Most of those captured were infantrymen who had infiltrated deep into the grey zone and taken shelter in the ruins of settlements, from which soldiers of the 3rd Army Corps drove them out while clearing buildings.
According to official figures, Russian military personnel losses resulting from the operation amounted to 2,000 soldiers, although documented cases account for only part of the actual toll. Estimates suggest that the number of those killed may have reached 3,000–4,000, while total killed and wounded could have approached 5,000. Pro-Russian separatist Oleg Tsaryov addressed the issue, demanding that the Russian command provide accurate information about prisoners of war and acknowledge and explain any potential failure.
At present, Ukrainian forces have strengthened their positions along the Lyman axis in Donetsk Oblast and reduced the threat of a potential Russian offensive towards Sviatohirsk and Lyman. As a result, Russian forces have been compelled to redeploy troops to this sector, weakening their positions in other parts of the front. According to Roman Svitan, a Ukrainian reserve colonel, the next task for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is to reach the Chornyi Zherebets River and establish defensive lines along its banks.
Meanwhile, Colonel Markus Reisner, an Austrian military expert, emphasizes that, to sustain the offensive’s operational momentum, Ukrainian forces must break through Russian defensive lines with the support of infantry and combat robots before continuing their advance. The key question remains whether Ukraine will be able to hold the positions captured during Operation “Vivaldi” and whether the model of warfare employed can be successfully replicated along other sections of the 1,250-kilometre front line.
The Ukrainian campaign provides another example of the increasing technological sophistication of warfare and the growing importance of drones and ground robots in combat operations. Colonel Markus Reisner described it as one of the most technologically advanced operations in the modern history of armed conflict. By combining unmanned systems, electronic warfare and precision planning, the Ukrainian military created the conditions necessary for an offensive, committing infantry only in the second phase of the operation.
The experience Ukraine has accumulated over more than a decade of conflict is now becoming one of the decisive factors shaping the evolution of modern warfare and may set military trends for NATO countries and other states around the world. Considered alongside battlefield operations, Ukraine’s long-range strikes against the enemy’s rear infrastructure—including energy facilities such as oil-processing plants and logistics infrastructure, including Wildberries and Ozon warehouses—raise the question of whether this strategy will enable Ukraine to turn the tide of the war.
