RRussian Oligarchs' Perspective.
A striking interview with one of Russia’s most powerful oligarchs, Andrey Melnichenko, has appeared in The Economist. The Russian is one of those businessmen who, through close ties with the Kremlin’s system of power, controls major sectors of the Russian market — fertilisers and coal — in exchange for loyalty. While this alliance serves the interests of both partners, Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia are making the businessman increasingly dissatisfied with this arrangement. In this context, Melnichenko’s comments to The Economist should be interpreted as reflecting the views of Russia’s oligarch-industrialists.
The Russian businessman “speaks out” in order to share the following argument with the magazine:
Continuing the war will weaken Russia to such an extent that the political order of the Russian Federation that emerges from the ruins of today’s Kremlin will be worse, both for the West and for the people of Russia, than the current one. He then lists the scenarios that prevented the Biden administration from providing Ukraine with decisive assistance at the beginning of the war: the collapse of Russia and the proliferation of nuclear weapons among unpredictable warlords emerging from the fall of the Kremlin, or Russia becoming a Chinese vassal — a scenario that could be described as an “inverse Kissinger.”
According to Melnichenko, in order to protect both the West and Russia from these unpleasant consequences, a choice must be made: “either the great powers learn once again to respect each other’s sovereignty, or each of them will continue trying to turn the others into objects of external management.” Melnichenko argues that such sovereignty would entail giving Russia a free hand in deciding its most important security matters, including its sphere of influence in the near abroad.
The 60-hour interview with Melnichenko can therefore be summarised in two paragraphs. Or, alternatively, in a single sentence: “let’s return to business as usual, because the war is in nobody’s interest” — especially not in the interests of oligarchs. The interview was conducted in the context of massive drone attacks on the infrastructure of Russian industrialists. It was most likely these “long-range sanctions” that prompted Melnichenko to speak out in The Economist, calling for an end to the conflict and the resumption of business relations. The Kremlin is becoming increasingly ineffective at protecting its economic dependants from Ukraine.
Normalisation of German-Russian Relations
Meanwhile, on 21 July in Berlin, the President of Azerbaijan, during a meeting with Chancellor Merz, told journalists and reporters that regular secret meetings between Germans and Russians were taking place in Baku. On the German side, the participants include Ronald Pofalla of the CDU (former Chief of Staff to Angela Merkel) and Matthias Platzeck of the SPD (former Minister-President of Brandenburg). On the Russian side, the participants are Viktor Zubkov (Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Gazprom) and Valery Fadeyev (Director of the Institute for Social Design). Both Russians are subject to EU sanctions.
Aliyev’s words merely confirmed media reports published by the German newspaper Die Zeit. The participants themselves refer to these meetings as the “Petersburg Dialogue”, the name of a format intended to bring the two countries closer together in the 2000s. It was established at the time by Putin and Chancellor Schröder. The format came to an end following the invasion of Ukraine. As Deutsche Welle adds, the meeting took place on the same day that the Russian ambassador, summoned to the Reichstag, appeared before a representative of the German government over Russian cyberattacks against the Federal Republic of Germany.
Friedrich Merz declined to comment on the matter. The Chancellor’s representative responded to journalists’ questions: “This is not a government initiative. We have nothing further to add.”
The German government is, however, pursuing an initiative to resume cooperation with one of Russia’s largest and most important energy companies — Rosatom.
French company Framatome, which operates in Northern Saxony (where a coalition of the SPD and the Greens is in power), applied to the state government for permission to produce nuclear fuel as part of a joint venture with Russia’s TVEL and Rosatom. The application was approved and subsequently received the countersignature of the federal government. Germany justified its approval by referring to the specific nature of its nuclear legislation: authorities cannot reject an application if it has been properly submitted and the initiative meets the relevant requirements.
Both the federal and state governments were therefore said to have had their hands tied. The only authority that could potentially have blocked such an initiative was the EU itself. At the European level, however, sanctions prohibiting cooperation with Russia in the field of nuclear energy have never been established.
The investment has generated considerable controversy not only because of the approval of cooperation with a Russian energy company, but also because of national-security concerns. Critics argue that cooperation with the Russians exposes Germany’s energy industry to infiltration by foreign agents working within Rosatom’s German-French subsidiary. Framatome takes this threat seriously enough to have announced that, as part of the joint venture, Russian employees will be prohibited from having physical access to the facility. At the same time, the cooperation will be subject to audits conducted by external companies.
It should nevertheless be noted that both Polish and German administrative law provides for the possibility of refusing to issue a permit where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a given activity may threaten national security. Despite the identified risks, the authorities decided not to prevent cooperation between Russian and French entities in Germany.
The Fallen Will Be Replaced by Indians
The Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Budanov, argued at a meeting with students at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy that Ukraine needs to import workers from the Global South. “We must bring our citizens back and attract specialists from different parts of the world. There is no other option,” stated the former intelligence chief.
The number of people currently living in Ukrainian-controlled territory is difficult to establish. The problem begins with defining exactly where Ukraine is. Should its population be understood as people living within the borders established in 1991, or only those remaining under Kyiv’s control? Do residents of Crimea have a different status from those living in the occupied territories?
The Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) reports that as recently as 2019, 37 million people lived in Ukraine. According to Money.pl, the figure before the invasion was 42 million, while the World Bank put it at 45 million. Following the invasion, the figure has become even more difficult to determine and currently ranges from 25 to 35 million people. Some Eastern European sources, however, cite a statement by Ukraine’s Minister of Social Policy, Denys Ulutin, who claims that the number of people remaining under Kyiv’s control could, in a pessimistic scenario, be as low as 22 million. It is also worth noting that, in addition to shrinking, Ukrainian society is ageing rapidly.
These figures have negative implications for the country’s prospects for post-war reconstruction. Tymofiy Milovanov, a former economy minister, notes that maintaining a favourable ratio of pensioners to working-age people will be crucial to the country’s future. As he puts it, “cheap immigrant labour will fill the gaps [in the labour market].”
Vasyl Voskoboynyk, head of an NGO representing labour-mobility agencies, has also joined the debate. These are companies involved in facilitating Ukrainians’ migration to the West, as well as the recruitment of workers from the Global South to Ukraine. He argues: “We need 8.2 million workers [...] we must either encourage women to have more children, which would take 18–20 years to fill the labour-market gap, or we genuinely need to look for workers among immigrants from other countries.” The head of the organisation adds that, if such a project were implemented, immigrants would account for 17.5% of the country’s population.
Given Ukraine’s ageing society, this proportion would be considerably higher if measured only against the working-age population.
While this statement does not represent the official position of the government in Kyiv, but rather Voskoboynyk’s expectations, significant steps have nevertheless been taken on Bankova Street to open Ukraine to immigrants from the Global South. According to Kyrylo Budanov, “if Ukraine genuinely wants to attract workers from Asia, Africa and Latin America in the future, it must first make the migration process faster and simpler.” The first step in this direction would be to review the list of countries classified as being at “migration risk”, which were placed on the list out of concern that Ukraine could become a transit migration hub — a route through Ukraine and onward to the European Union.
For this purpose, as early as April, Budanov met with representatives of African countries to determine which of them could have some of the restrictions related to visa movement lifted.
In addition, Kyiv plans to expand its network of diplomatic missions in Africa. Before the invasion, there were only 10 Ukrainian embassies on the continent. There are now 18, and the number is expected to rise to 21 in the near future, more than doubling the number of missions that existed before the war. In addition, the Ukrainian parliament is working to make it easier for immigrants to regularise their status as foreign workers.
Bill No. 14211, on which the Verkhovna Rada is expected to vote soon, is intended to simplify the existing procedures and encourage migration to Ukraine not only from Africa but from across the Global South, for people willing to relocate to Eastern Europe for employment.
The Ukrainian plan raises two obvious and immediate problems. The first is the importation of foreigners from distant countries into a nation engulfed by war and nationalism — a nation engaged in a struggle to preserve Ukraine from losing its identity. The context in which this migration would take place suggests that the integration of immigrants would be difficult, while xenophobic sentiments could make the task even harder.
An article in the Kyiv Post entitled “Fears of Other ‘Invasion’” describes growing anti-immigration sentiment among our eastern neighbours. On the one hand, these fears concern the possibility of repeating scenarios familiar from Western Europe. On the other, users of Ukrainian social media point to the perceived unfairness of such a solution. While Ukrainians are dying at the front, foreigners would move into the country — people who did not participate in the nation’s bloody struggle, yet would benefit from the peace won by others without contributing to that fight.
This scenario also assumes the absence of the “baby boom” that often follows the end of a war and contributes to rebuilding a nation after a deadly conflict. Instead, population growth would be replaced by migration from the Global South.
The second problem — one that directly affects the Republic of Poland — is the risk of Ukraine turning into a “migration corridor”. The restrictions recently lifted for as many as 70 countries had been intended, among other things, to protect Ukraine from precisely such a scenario. Visa restrictions were eased, among others, for Pakistan, India, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Ethiopia. Given the freedom of movement between Ukraine and Poland, the risk of immigrants subsequently flowing into Poland is also increasing. In this context, it is worth emphasising that the labour shortage in Ukraine is estimated to be as high as 8 million workers.
Fuel Crisis in Russia
The fuel crisis in Russia, ongoing for several months — and according to some experts, even since the first half of 2023 — had spread across the entire country by July 2026. Its current phase began in May, when Ukraine significantly intensified drone attacks against Russian oil infrastructure. This was the result of a change in Ukraine’s approach to warfare and the adoption of a new strategy based on systematic strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure, aimed, among other objectives, at reducing the opponent’s logistical capabilities.
Among the immediate effects achieved by the Ukrainian side are disruptions to fuel supplies for Russian troops fighting on the front line, restrictions on the delivery of components to military-industrial facilities, and an increase in the costs of Russia’s military operations. In the broader perspective, these actions are intended to put pressure on Russian authorities and force them to end the war.
The implementation of this strategy was enabled by innovations introduced by Mykhailo Fedorov, who until recently served as Ukraine’s Minister of Defence. He focused on the development of unmanned technologies, expanding drone production and procurement, as well as eliminating corrupt practices in the military procurement system. These reforms initiated within the Ministry of Defence allowed Ukraine to seize the initiative on the battlefield, and one of the clearest examples of their effectiveness is the latest operation following the severing of Crimea’s connection with mainland Russia.
It was precisely on the occupied peninsula that fuel supply problems emerged first and gradually spread to subsequent regions of the Russian Federation.
The first regional fuel shortages that appeared in June developed into a nationwide crisis in July. The targets of the Ukrainian campaign included various elements of Russia’s fuel sector: oil and gas processing facilities, petrochemical installations, fuel storage sites and tanks, transshipment terminals, pipelines and pumping stations, distribution hubs, as well as selected fuel transportation units.
However, the intensification of attacks against Russian refineries played a particularly important role. Since the beginning of the year, Ukraine has carried out at least 194 strikes against such facilities, representing an elevenfold increase in activity compared with the same period of the previous year. The highest frequency of attacks was recorded in May, when Ukrainian drones targeted refinery installations in various Russian regions approximately 16 times within a single month.
As a result of these operations, the functioning of several of Russia’s largest refineries was disrupted, including the Omsk Oil Refinery — the largest and one of the most technologically advanced facilities of its kind in Russia, located more than 2,000 kilometres from the Ukrainian border; the NORSI refinery — the country’s fourth-largest refinery and the second-largest producer of gasoline; and the Yaroslavl refinery, which has an annual processing capacity of approximately 15 million tonnes of crude oil.
It is worth noting that during these attacks Ukrainian drones target strategic technological components of these facilities — primary oil processing units and secondary refining installations. These elements are difficult to replace, and their destruction results in the shutdown of the entire production process. This means a reduction in the actual refining capacity of affected facilities for several months, corresponding to the time required for repairs.
The cumulative effect of successive waves of Ukrainian strikes led to the shutdown of more than 30% of Russia’s operating refineries, accounting for approximately 45% of the country’s nominal refining capacity. The scale of these disruptions makes the current fuel crisis the most serious problem of this kind in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The extent of the crisis is best illustrated by the fact that at the beginning of July, Russia’s total gasoline production was sufficient to cover only around 65% of average seasonal demand, which at that time amounted to approximately 115–120 thousand tonnes per day. This resulted in a daily shortage of 40–45 thousand tonnes of gasoline, equivalent to around 35% of summer consumption. For comparison, in June the daily deficit amounted to approximately 25%, indicating that the July situation represented a further deterioration of a downward trend in fuel production that had been developing for several months.
This translated into limited availability of motor gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, and other refined petroleum products on the domestic market. In some regions, the shortages also led to the depletion of local fuel reserves.
Initially, Russian authorities avoided publicly acknowledging the scale of the growing problem and reported that some refineries were operating under emergency conditions due to “unscheduled maintenance.” At the same time, many regions began introducing fuel sales restrictions, including quantity limits at petrol stations and bans on filling fuel containers and additional tanks.
As a result, multi-kilometre queues began forming at petrol stations, with waiting times ranging from 18 to 25 hours, while in the most extreme cases they reached 30–50 hours. Such a situation occurred, among other places, in Chita (Russian: Чита), the capital of Zabaykalsky Krai.
Increasing tensions and disputes between drivers were also reported in fuel queues. For example, in Anapa, a popular Black Sea resort in Krasnodar Krai, local authorities deployed Cossack units to maintain order. Their tasks included directing traffic, preventing incidents, and stopping attempts to fill fuel containers.
In addition to official price increases, cases of speculation and the development of an informal fuel market were also recorded. For example, in Rostov Oblast, a resident of Krasnodar was detained while transporting 1.6 tonnes of gasoline, which he intended to resell at inflated prices in the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
The fuel shortage also contributed to the emergence of so-called fuel tourism — residents of Russia’s border regions began travelling to neighbouring Kazakhstan in order to replenish their fuel supplies. Due to increased fuel consumption in northern parts of the country, Kazakh authorities introduced restrictions, reducing the frequency with which passenger cars and trucks could cross the border to once per day. At the same time, local services detected 61 attempts to export more than 3 tonnes of fuel stored in additional tanks and containers.
Across Russia, priority fuel distribution systems were also introduced. Priority access was granted to emergency services, public transport, municipal enterprises, the agricultural sector, and selected social groups. In the previously mentioned city of Chita, participants of the “special military operation” (SMO) and their families were allowed to receive fuel without waiting in queues.
Meanwhile, in Volgograd, Krasnodar Krai, Chelyabinsk, and Yekaterinburg, cases were reported in which local officials refuelled their private vehicles at selected stations by registering them as official service vehicles. In Saratov, fuel allocated for officials was distributed after providing a special password — “government” (Russian: правительство).
At the same time, residents of Novosibirsk and Tomsk oblasts were advised to reduce the use of private transport and switch to remote work where possible.
It is also important to note the geographical differentiation of the effects of the crisis. Following the attack on the Moscow Oil Refinery in mid-June, fuel supplies produced in the Urals and Siberia, as well as imported from Belarus, were redirected to Moscow Oblast. This demonstrates the preferential treatment of Moscow — the centre of Russia’s political elite and an urban agglomeration inhabited by nearly 22 million people, accounting for approximately 15% of the country’s population and representing a significant part of the electorate.
In this context, both image-related considerations and the desire to minimise economic losses similar to those previously caused by internet restrictions in the capital played a key role. A completely different situation developed in occupied Crimea, where fuel supply problems resulted in interruptions in energy distribution and the suspension of parts of urban infrastructure.
By contrast, Chukotka, located on the opposite side of the Russian Federation, remained the only region where no fuel restrictions were introduced. This was primarily due to its considerable distance from the zone of military operations.
Measures taken by the Russian government to counter the crisis began with a ban on gasoline exports introduced in April 2026. In July, this was expanded through a complete ban on diesel fuel exports, and all export restrictions were subsequently extended until 31 January 2027.
The only exceptions concern supplies carried out under intergovernmental agreements. Additionally, from 1 September, restrictions will no longer apply to exports conducted directly by producers of diesel fuel, marine fuel, and other gas oils.
At the same time, Russia began importing fuel products from abroad. The first and most important supplier was its ally Belarus. In July, Belarusian gasoline deliveries to Russia reached approximately 212,000 tonnes, representing a 25-fold increase compared with the same period in 2025. Diesel fuel supplies increased to 162,000 tonnes, almost seven times higher than the previous year.
The unprecedented scale of this increase is also visible in the following comparison: in June, Russia imported 141,000 tonnes of gasoline from Belarus, while a year earlier the total volume supplied amounted to only 1,000 tonnes.
Belarus achieved such a significant increase in fuel exports to the Russian market at the expense of part of its previous supplies directed toward Central Asian countries. As a consequence, the transit of Belarusian fuel products through Russia decreased significantly — from 196,000 tonnes at the beginning of the year to 24,000 tonnes in June.
Another source of gasoline supplies became India. Two tankers carrying a combined total of at least 60,000 tonnes of fuel were sent to Russia by sea.
At the same time, India — the world’s third-largest importer of crude oil — remains one of the largest buyers of Russian oil. For example, in June, Indian imports of Russian crude reached a record level of approximately 2.7 million barrels per day, accounting for more than half of India’s total oil imports.
In order to address shortages, Russia also began increasing fuel imports from Kazakhstan. According to Reuters, in July and August Kazakhstan was expected to supply Russia with approximately 50,000 tonnes of gasoline as part of “humanitarian assistance.” However, this amount would only cover roughly half a day of Russia’s domestic demand.
Discussions were also held regarding the processing of Russian crude oil in Kazakh refineries and the partial return of finished fuel products to Russia.
Furthermore, in the second half of July, Russia imported fuel from Morocco for the first time in its history. Around 30,000 tonnes of AI-92 gasoline were transported by sea from Tangier, located near the Strait of Gibraltar, to the port of Murmansk.
However, Russia failed to implement a plan to obtain aviation fuel from Japan. Under the proposed arrangement, Russia was supposed to import approximately 200,000 barrels of aviation fuel through intermediaries.
During the first half of July, the cargo was planned to be loaded at the port of Chiba in Japan, transported to South Korea, and then transferred through a ship-to-ship operation near the port of Yeosu before being delivered to Russia.
Following reports about this scheme, Japan tightened its interpretation of its sanctions regime. Economy Minister Ryosei Akazawa stated that the ban on aviation fuel exports to Russia also applies to deliveries conducted through third countries and maritime transshipments.
The Russian government’s efforts to stabilise the fuel market also included measures implemented domestically. One of the most important steps was the temporary authorisation of the production, import, and sale of lower environmental standard gasoline — Euro-2, Euro-3, and Euro-4.
These are fuel emission standards established by the European Union, defining the maximum permissible levels of harmful substances released by vehicles. The introduction of such requirements was aimed at reducing the negative environmental impact of transport by limiting emissions of nitrogen oxides, hydrocarbons, and carbon monoxide into the atmosphere.
However, none of these standards remain applicable to the production of new vehicles today. Euro-2 entered into force in 1997, while Euro-4 ceased to apply on 1 January 2011. Although the current standard is the significantly stricter Euro-6 norm, the Russian government authorised the circulation of fuels with lower environmental parameters until 1 July 2027.
Another proposal put forward by Russian politicians as a solution to the fuel crisis was the creation of a decentralised network of small-scale refineries across Russia. The assumption behind this concept is that such a system would increase the resilience of the domestic fuel market by decentralising production and reducing dependence on large processing facilities, which are currently the primary targets of Ukrainian attacks.
The so-called mini-refineries promoted by Russian authorities are small-scale installations designed to process crude oil or petroleum intermediates into fuel products, with an annual production capacity not exceeding 1 million tonnes.
Due to the absence of advanced and expensive technological equipment, these facilities are unable to produce high-octane gasoline that meets modern quality requirements. Their production profile therefore mainly includes straight-run gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, and marine fuel.
Despite these limitations, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally supported this initiative during a government meeting and stressed the need for greater involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises in developing such projects.
As a result, some companies have already begun work in this direction, and the issue itself has been repeatedly discussed during government meetings with oil companies.
However, it should be emphasised that, apart from the problem of low-quality fuel production, mini-refineries have numerous other disadvantages. These include long implementation periods, which may range from several to more than ten years, high construction and equipment costs, the need to provide additional protection for infrastructure vulnerable to potential attacks, the lack of comprehensive state support mechanisms, and difficulties in achieving profitability under current economic conditions.
Furthermore, the official refining sector is supplemented by an extensive grey market. Alongside legally registered facilities with a combined production capacity exceeding 12 million tonnes annually, Russia has approximately 300 illegal processing installations known as “samovars”, whose products are introduced into circulation outside the official system.
These factors mean that, despite growing interest in such facilities, their ability to significantly improve fuel availability on the Russian market remains limited.
The deepening fuel crisis reveals structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities in Russia’s energy security system. Another indication of this vulnerability is provided by recent Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s shadow fleet in the Azov and Black Sea regions, which resulted in the damage of 136 Russian vessels within ten days.
The destruction of energy reserves and fuel infrastructure directly disrupts Russian logistical chains, as demonstrated, among other things, by the decision to suspend transport through the Azov–Don Canal.
The loss of fuel production capacity reduces Russia’s export capabilities and consequently decreases revenues obtained from foreign sales of petroleum products. In the longer term, this may lead to a further decline in state budget revenues and complicate the financing of Russia’s war effort, particularly given that the budget deficit since April 2026 has been partially offset through further cuts in civilian spending.
It is important, however, to remember that Russia’s problem is not a lack of crude oil, but rather an inability to transform it into finished petroleum products. This situation is further aggravated by difficulties in rebuilding damaged refineries, resulting from the risk of additional attacks, limited access to technology and spare parts, and high repair costs.
The decision to restrict fuel exports from Russia undermines the image of the country as an energy superpower, a concept that has for years constituted an important element of Russian political and economic narratives. Currently, one of the world’s largest oil and gas powers is forced to import petroleum products from countries over which it previously held a dominant position.
At the same time, the reduction of Russian fuel exports may create new opportunities for countries that have traditionally been dependent on Russian energy supplies. For some states in Russia’s “near abroad,” such as Armenia, this may represent an opportunity to diversify supply sources and gradually reduce dependence on Moscow.
Countries with developed refining sectors, such as Kazakhstan, may use this situation to strengthen their role as regional suppliers of petroleum products. Problems within the Russian refining sector may also encourage the expansion of competing energy exporters, which could fill the emerging supply gap.
At the same time, a decline in Russian export activity may contribute to greater instability on global energy markets, particularly amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.
Meanwhile, Ukraine, as the actor responsible for the current crisis from the Russian perspective, may face an intensification of Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure and retaliatory actions, including strikes against Ukrainian petrol stations and fuel facilities.
The winter period will be particularly significant, as the risk of attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and the recurrence of blackouts known from previous years will increase. Attention should also be drawn to the statement made by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on 5 July 2026, who, referring to the current military situation, stated that the “special military operation has transformed into a real war.”
The fuel crisis has also become one of the many social problems affecting the Russian Federation. The everyday lives of citizens have once again been disrupted. Unlike previous restrictions on digital communication resulting from internet blockages, people are now increasingly experiencing limitations on physical mobility caused by fuel shortages.
However, the consequences of both phenomena remain similar: reduced freedom of movement and limited access to basic forms of communication.
While during internet restrictions Russians searched for ways to regain access to online services through tools such as VPNs, the current situation has led to growing interest in information regarding, for example, methods of producing gasoline at home.
At the same time, fuel shortages have exposed existing regional inequalities in Russia and the centre–periphery relationship, in which some regions have been forced to reduce their own supplies in order to maintain relative stability in the country’s largest urban centres.
The current situation represents another reputational setback for Vladimir Putin. His approval rating has been declining for several weeks and currently stands at 66%. Russian citizens are increasingly recognising the gap between the myth of a strong and self-sufficient Russia and their own everyday experiences.
In the long term, this may contribute to a gradual erosion of public trust in the state, which for years has portrayed itself as omnipotent but is increasingly unable to guarantee even basic security.
