In Washington, the debate on the future of the alliance has entered a new stage. The issue of a strategic U.S. retreat from Europe is no longer in doubt; the open question is what NATO will look like after a partial U.S. withdrawal. This is especially visible in the context of the recent announcement of the withdrawal of 5,000 soldiers from Germany, the cancellation of plans to send a long-range precision strike battalion to Lithuania, and the suspension of the rotation of an armored brigade in Poland^[1]. In addition, Washington has signaled a possible reduction in the size of the contingent sent to Europe in the event of a Russian attack, while at the same time assuring that the nuclear umbrella over Europe will be maintained. The current administration is trying to force a shift in the burden of Europe's defense in connection with the concentration on the conflict with China.

How is this perceived in the United States?

The American think tank Council on Foreign Relations draws attention to NATO as an element of U.S. power projection and to the unpopularity of the current administration's narrative criticizing NATO and its allies. James M. Lindsay suggests that the U.S. withdrawal from NATO would be a strategic mistake that would weaken both Europe and the United States. The main conclusion of his CFR article is that Trump does not need to formally leave NATO in order to weaken it; the narrative itself pursued by the current administration undermines the alliance's strategic signaling, which is largely based on belief in deterrence. Deterrence in NATO's history proved to be its main success during the Cold War. The current questioning of allied cohesion, which rests on American security guarantees, undermines the foundations on which NATO was created. According to James Lindsay, the current conflict no longer stems from defense spending, which among all alliance states has reached or is reaching 2%, but rather from allies' reluctance to become involved in conflicts currently being conducted by the United States^[2].

The Atlantic Council draws attention to the issue of changing the alliance's formula in light of differing perceptions of threats. The authors — Léonie Allard and Torrey Taussig — point to the view dominant among American elites and in the administration that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. The text emphasizes that Europe should continue efforts to increase defense spending, build an arms industry, form coalitions of the willing, undertake joint actions to develop capabilities that have so far been provided by the United States, and prepare to act with limited U.S. support. The main thesis of the Atlantic Council article is that greater European responsibility for security is not meant to save NATO from collapse, but to prevent the disintegration of transatlantic relations^[3].

In a statement from 22 May 2026, Marco Rubio emphasized that “NATO has to be good for all involved,” thereby laying the groundwork for further talks on redefining alliance commitments within NATO. In his statement, he pointed to the conditional nature of U.S. involvement — the American commitment is not “automatic” but depends on the investments made by allies. Ultimately, the statement serves to prepare the ground for the summit in Ankara, where the talks are expected to establish a new framework for NATO's functioning and redefine burden-sharing mechanisms in defense^[4].

According to Reuters, the Pentagon gave European diplomats a date — 2027 — by which European states should assume greater responsibility for land forces, air defense, intelligence, and logistics. Washington deemed European rearmament and increased spending insufficient and expects Europe to take over responsibility for most capabilities and operational matters by 2027. According to Reuters, this is not only a matter of changing the division of burdens and responsibilities, but an attempt to redefine the NATO model in the following format: Europe as the main provider of conventional forces, the United States as the provider of strategic nuclear deterrence and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities^[5].

Washington is currently planning to reduce the pool of U.S. conventional forces available in the event of armed conflict. The planned reduction includes the forces available under the NATO Force Model — the pool of allied forces available during crises. This is another element of the attempt to shape a new NATO format in which the United States limits its operational guarantees for Europe, while retaining the model of distributing strategic effectors (an effector is a means or system capable of acting on a detected target in order to destroy, damage, neutralize, or disrupt it)^[6]. Washington fears decision-making chaos in NATO due to the administration's policy, the bilateralization of defense, and the emergence of multiple small regional formats. This could lead to erosion of Article 5. In this context, Reuters reported the possibility of reducing the number of annual summits in order to limit the controversy surrounding the communications presented by Donald Trump^[7].

The Ankara Summit

In the American public debate, the Ankara summit is largely seen as a “test” of Turkey's loyalty to the collective West. Turkey, which has pursued a multi-vector policy for many years, is increasing its influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean (Mavi Vatan). The Atlantic Council emphasizes that the Ankara summit may be a strategic opportunity to reset relations between the United States and Turkey. Relations remain tense due to Turkey blocking certain NATO decisions (for example, Sweden's accession to the alliance), tensions along the Turkey–Israel line, Turkey's relations with Russia, and Erdoğan's construction of his own regional security system. Washington and Ankara are now trying to build relations based on functional compromise; the description of Turkey as a “problematic ally” is now shifting toward a difficult, yet strategically irreplaceable ally. Washington is also aware of Ankara's multi-vector and unpredictable policy^[8]. Turkey has a developed defense industry and is also expected to support the United States in shifting the burden of Europe's defense and to play a stabilizing role in the Middle East.

According to current analyses, the Ankara summit is expected to bring: further increases in European financial commitments, a reorganization of the architecture of expenditures and security burdens, greater focus on the southern flank (the Middle East, the Black Sea), and the maintenance of U.S. political dominance in NATO despite reduced military engagement. European allies (especially Germany and France) may be unwilling to accept further U.S. political primacy in the context of the reduction of U.S. involvement in Europe.

Division of Responsibilities in Deterrence

The policy of ambiguity pursued by the current administration leads to weakening of deterrence, which is closely linked to the signals sent by the administration through its various actions. Negative signals include, among others, weakening contingents in Europe and the refusal to rotate troops while at the same time speaking of maintaining the nuclear umbrella. Deterrence should be understood holistically; weakening any of its elements has a negative impact on the overall deterrence effort. The policy of “burden-sharing” is justified by Europeans' enjoyment of the peace dividend in the years preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the current form of this policy negatively affects transatlantic relations, NATO credibility, and deterrence. The reduction of U.S. conventional forces in Europe deprives the current administration of one of its policy instruments vis-à-vis Russia. The basic conclusion from research on deterrence during the Cold War is that conventional deterrence is the strongest form of deterrence because, beyond the ability to deny the adversary potential action (deterrence by denial) or punish it (deterrence by punishment), it allows flexibility in responding to threats. Maintaining U.S. conventional forces makes it possible to retain certain capabilities in the European theater of operations that allies do not possess — such as long-range precision strikes from land, sea, and air^[9]. Possession of these capabilities by fighting Ukraine has proven extremely costly for the Russian Federation, especially for its fuel infrastructure. Russia has not committed its full potential against Ukraine; many capabilities are kept in reserve against potential NATO opponents. The continued U.S. presence, especially in terms of strike capabilities in the adversary's rear, effectively deters Russia from using those capabilities. This is of key importance until European allies develop appropriate capabilities that could partly replace U.S. involvement on the continent.

Credible deterrence is based on strong signaling of the intention to defend and support allies; strategic communication that limits such action also affects the calculations of potential adversaries, encouraging them to engage in hostile actions. It also rests on possessing capabilities at every level of multidomain operations. Limiting oneself to strategic nuclear effectors removes escalation and de-escalation flexibility and encourages potential adversaries to take risky actions.

Conclusion

Analyzing statements from American think tanks and members of President Donald Trump's administration, one can observe attempts to develop a new format for burden-sharing within NATO. The Americans retain strategic effectors and sensors (a sensor is a device or system used to detect, observe, identify, and track objects and to collect information about the environment), but conventional operations are to be taken over mostly by Europeans. According to Washington, the new division of responsibilities is meant to protect transatlantic relations from disintegration, yet the maintenance of American primacy is closely tied to its contribution to Europe's security. The Ankara summit will provide answers as to whether a new format of cooperation can be developed for the coming years, or whether transatlantic relations will continue to deteriorate. By encouraging allies to take greater responsibility for security, Washington is acting in NATO's interest, but reducing conventional military potential — especially in areas where allies lack capabilities — removes the escalation flexibility and credibility necessary for Washington.

Bibliography

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