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The concept of hybrid warfare has been familiar since the advent of armed conflict. However, it has gained prominence in recent years, beginning with the 1999 publication of Unrestricted Warfare by Chinese colonels, followed by The Rise of Hybrid Warfare by U.S. Army officers in 2005. A real-life demonstration of hybrid warfare was seen in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, the concept itself is often criticized for its lack of clarity, absence of a general definition, and reputation as a “buzzword.” In recent years, Russian expansionism has posed a significant threat to the Three- Seas Initiative states. Beyond the direct threat of war, hybrid and gray zone actions have emerged as critical concerns. These threats are difficult to identify and counter and often include actions aimed at destabilizing critical infrastructure, compromising information systems, undermining trust in public institutions, conducting cyberattacks, and deepening social divisions. This situation has led to a redefinition of security, traditionally understood as a military concern, now expanded to include softer aspects encompassing cultural, religious, social, ecological, humanitarian, infrastructural, and technological dimensions. Precisely defining hybrid action is challenging; however, in terms of conflict strategy, it implies a blend of symmetric and asymmetric warfare. The European External Action Service describes a hybrid threat as “a combination of conventional and unconventional actions used in a coordinated manner by state and non-state actors to achieve political objectives”

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