India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960; according to this treaty, the waters of the western rivers, including the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum of the Indus basin, which flow into Pakistan, belong to Pakistan; while the waters of the eastern rivers, including the Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej, belong to India (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960). This agreement has endured for over six decades, despite multiple wars, limited military operations, and persistent diplomatic tensions between the two nations.
In April 2025, following a significant terrorist attack in Pahalgam in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, India formally placed the Indus Waters Treaty in ‘abeyance’, signifying a temporary suspension until specific conditions are met (Law Definer, 2026; Merriam-Webster Thesaurus, 2026; The Times of India, 2025).
In 2026, the Indus Waters Treaty issue returned to prominence because, on May 15, 2026, the Court of Arbitration (CoA) at The Hague, Netherlands, issued its ruling on India's hydroelectric projects on the western rivers of the Indus basin (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2026). This case has been ongoing since 2022-2023, as India commenced building dams on the Indus river for hydroelectricity projects (Kumar, 2022; Murphy et al., 2026; Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2026).
The ruling addresses the volume of water India can temporarily store at these dams; the court also requested that India ensure water flows downstream to Pakistan to mitigate environmental harm. Generally, the court stated that India cannot cite ‘power generation’ as a justification for holding additional water. While this is purely a technical decision on dam engineering that does not address the treaty suspension (Murphy et al., 2026).
India rejected the ruling by asserting that the tribunal was illegally constituted, making any award or decision issued by the CoA is null and void, and maintaining that the Indus Waters Treaty will remain suspended (Fazil, 2026; Press Trust of India, 2026).
India put this treaty in abeyance, meaning India will stop sharing data of western rivers on water storage, dam releases, and flood warning, and water supply in response to Pakistan's timely demands. Earlier, Pakistan could ask for water supply based on weather, water needs, and climate, among other factors; however, now India will not supply water on these agreed terms.
Now, India can store and control the water flow, but not "completely stop". Against this backdrop, Pakistan is still supposed to get the limited amount of Indus River's basin water, because stopping water is practically not possible, due to India’s lack of storage infrastructure on the Western rivers (Business Today Desk, 2026; Matrubhumi News Desk, 2026).
India has remained firm in its decision to halt the treaty and divert the waters of the western riparian rivers for its own use, rather than allowing them to flow into Pakistan (Kumar, 2022; Murphy et al., 2026; Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2026).
The following rationales have been provided by the Indian side to justify its position on the abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty and the construction of hydroelectric projects on the western-flowing rivers:
A) Water and Blood cannot flow together
India has maintained that “water and blood cannot flow together,” asserting that if Pakistan continues to sponsor terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and attempts to foster regional instability, India cannot continue cooperating with Pakistan in any capacity, whether economic, cultural, or through standard diplomatic engagement. In this context, the flow of Indus water is not an exception.
India's core argument is that when the treaty was signed in 1960, both Pakistan and India agreed in a spirit of goodwill to keep bilateral ties cordial and manage differences peacefully (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960; Ranjan, 2025). However, the political and security situation between the two countries deteriorated over time. The nations fought wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999, along with several minor and major border conflicts; furthermore, Pakistan began utilizing terrorism as an instrument of state policy against India, particularly in the Jammu and Kashmir region, since the late 1980s.
India has witnessed numerous terrorist attacks on its soil, including the 1993 Mumbai serial bombings, the 2000 hijacking of Air India’s IC-814, the 2001 attack on India’s parliament, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, the 2008 Mumbai (26/11) attack, and the terrorist attacks at Pathankot (2015), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam (2025). India maintains that these attacks originated from Pakistani soil and that the perpetrators were either trained, supported, or directed by Pakistan.
As a result, in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack, India decided to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty in 2025. This decision was not made abruptly; India had been considering this step for several years as terrorist attacks originating from Pakistan persisted despite efforts to improve bilateral relations. Some scholars also argued that India should suspend the treaty and restrict Pakistan's water supply as a pressure tactic, particularly after Pakistan and China decided to develop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), territory India considers sovereign.
India had also publicly announced its intention to build dams in the Indus River basin after the Uri and Pulwama terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of 19 Indian soldiers and 40 paramilitary personnel, respectively (Press Trust of India, 2019; The Deccan Herald, 2016). In this sense, the process of reducing Pakistan's access to water began prior to 2019.
It took years of planning before India finally suspended the treaty in 2025. Pakistan was aware of these developments; yet, rather than engaging in dialogue to improve relations, it continued to sponsor terrorism and plan attacks on Indian soil.
The Indus River is the most essential water source for Pakistan, as nearly eighty percent of its agricultural sector and a significant part of its economy depend upon the Indus River basin (Ali, 2025). India, as the upper riparian state, has the ability to regulate the flow of water. Despite this reality, Pakistan's leadership continued to escalate tensions by sponsoring terrorism, secure in the knowledge that the treaty had no built-in exit clause; for example, Article 12 (4) merely states that “the treaty shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose” (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, p. 156).
Additionally, Pakistan argues that under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a country cannot simply withdraw from a treaty because it becomes inconvenient or because relations sour (Nawaz, 2025). Article 26 codifies the principle of pacta sunt servanda, stating that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, p. 11).
Pakistan's position, therefore, is that India's unilateral suspension is a violation of both the Indus Waters Treaty and broader international legal obligations (Nawaz, 2025). This meant India had no unilateral legal route to end the treaty on its own.
However, there is an important distinction here: having political and security differences between two neighbouring countries is one thing, and it is both understandable and manageable through diplomacy. But sponsoring terrorism over decades, allowing terrorist camps to operate on one’s own territory, sending terrorists across the border, and targeting civilians of a state with which one has entered into a treaty in good faith are completely unacceptable.
For instance article 60 of VCLT about “Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach”, within that article 60 (1) specifically says “a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part”, meaning that if one country seriously breaks an important treaty obligation, in that case, the other country may have the right to stop following the treaty or suspend it (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, p. 20). Pakistan chose the latter course (that is sponsoring terrorism), which is clearly inconsistent with the principle of good faith underlying both the VCLT and the IWT.
Hence, continuing to sponsor terrorism while taking shelter under the protection of an international agreement amounts to a misuse of international law and is, in itself, internationally unjustifiable.
B) Pakistan’s limited water storage capacity
The second rationale from the Indian side for building dams and increasing storage capacity is that Pakistan's inadequate hydrological infrastructure prevents it from efficiently utilizing or storing the waters of the Indus River (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011; Ranjan & Donnellon-May, 2025). After meeting irrigation needs and generating limited electricity, a substantial volume of freshwater flows into the Arabian Sea, resulting in the loss of a valuable resource (Bhatia, 2026).
Pakistan’s internal mismanagement, increasing silt levels in dams, corruption and inefficiency in bureaucracy in water sector of Pakistan has been reported for the past 15 years (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011). Scholars and experts from Pakistan have also often reported water mismanagement within the country and suggested improving management infrastructure (Ali, 2025; Jahangiri, 2025; Nawaz Khan & Mukhtar, 2024; Saeed, 2026).
Yet, there has been no significant improvement in water management of Pakistan.
C) Better utilization of India’s share of water
Consequently, instead of allowing this freshwater to flow unused into the sea, India has argued that it should utilize the water for its own population. Referring to it as India's own resource, "haqq ka pani" (our rightful water), India has stated its intent to use this water for agriculture and to address severe scarcity in drought-prone regions such as Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan (Ramachandran, 2025).
From Dialogue to Deterrence: The Evolution of India’s Pakistan Policy:
These represent the three openly stated objectives. India expects that such pressure would discourage Pakistan from using terrorism as an instrument of state policy (Bhattacharjee, 2025). This shift comes after India tried multiple other options; for instance, after 2014, India's primary approach was to initiate dialogue to seek peaceful solutions. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Pakistan in 2015, yet shortly after, India witnessed another terrorist attack linked to Pakistan, followed by a series of attacks in subsequent years.
As a result, India adopted the policy that “talks and terror cannot go hand in hand.” In other words, India would not engage in comprehensive diplomacy or discuss major political issues as long as Pakistan continued its state-sponsored terrorism. Since then, political engagement has been very limited. In 2025, India further strengthened this policy by adding the principle that “blood and water cannot flow together,” indicating that bilateral relations continue to deteriorate and India's policy has become increasingly stringent.
Is this the permanent end of the Indus Waters Treaty?
The answer to this question depends solely on the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, especially Pakistan's behavior. If Pakistan continues to sponsor terrorism and foster instability, the treaty will likely remain in abeyance. However, if Pakistan chooses a rational course, such as dismantling terrorist infrastructure and finding amicable solutions to bilateral challenges, the treaty could potentially be resumed.
On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement; according to this agreement, the three countries have established a collective defense mechanism, meaning that any armed attack on one will be considered an attack on all; this act provides for enhanced defense cooperation among the three states (Ministry of Foreign affairs of Pakistan, 2026). For India, this is a complex geopolitical development, as it requires more careful retaliation in response to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
India's relations with Saudi Arabia are cordial, and it cannot take an uncalculated stance. Consequently, I anticipate that India's approach towards the Indus Waters Treaty will remain stringent, as the abeyance provides leverage to pressure Pakistan. Ultimately, the future of the treaty depends on how bilateral and regional dynamics unfold.
***
Author’s Bio: Nihar Kulkarni is a PhD researcher in International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. His research focuses on India’s foreign policy and national security, geopolitics of South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, great power politics, strategic partnerships, and alliance frameworks, and he has published research articles, policy briefs, and commentaries in globally recognised academic journals, think tanks, and media platforms. His work primarily examines evolving strategic and geopolitical dynamics in Asia and the broader international system.
Acknowledgement on the Use of AI Tools: AI tools used to improve this article for example restructuring specific passages, cross-referencing claims against primary source documents, and refining language and clarity.
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